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THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING TO PROTECT GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
 There is a noticeable difference between how courts treat asylum applicants from 
Central America with gang-based asylum claims and how they treat asylum 
applicants from Colombia with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)1 
based asylum claims. Typically, courts view applicants with gang-based asylum 
claims less favorably than applicants with FARC-based asylum claims. As a result, 
applicants from Central America with gang-based asylum claims are more often 
denied asylum and compelled to return to their home countries.
 This is noteworthy because the circumstances under which FARC-based asylum 
applicants are granted asylum—that they are unable or unwilling to return to their 
home countries because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of political opinion—are shared by gang-based asylum applicants. Central 
American asylum applicants fear persecution on account of political opinion, as their 
home countries have increasingly come under the control of violent gangs that their 
governments are unable or unwilling to control.2
 In recent years, there has been a massive increase in violence in El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras.3 In 2015, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala ranked 
first, fifth, and sixth, respectively, in global homicide rates.4 This extreme violence 
has forced many to f lee from Central America to the United States.5 Recently, it has 
been so dangerous for residents to remain in these countries that nearly ten per cent 
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras’s thirty million residents have left.6 This 
mass exodus made headlines when approximately 100,000 unaccompanied minors 
arrived at the United States’ southern border between October 2013 and July 2015.7 
1. The FARC is Colombia’s largest rebel group. Who Are the Farc?, BBC News (Nov. 24, 2016), http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-36605769. It was “founded in 1964 as the armed wing of the 
Communist Party and follow[s] a Marxist-Leninist ideology.” Id. FARC is an acronym, which stands 
for Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. FARC, InSight Crime, http://www.insightcrime.
org/colombia-organized-crime-news/farc-profile (last updated Mar. 3, 2017).
2. See UNHCR, Women on the Run: First-Hand Accounts of Refugees Fleeing El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico 2 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/5630f24c6.pdf.
3. Id. at 16.
4. Ashley Kirk, Mapped: Which Countries Have the Highest Murder Rates?, Telegraph (Dec. 11, 2015, 
10:07 AM GMT), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/12037479/Mapped-Which-
countries-have-the-highest-murder-rates.html. In addition, a 2015 report by the UNHCR found, “El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras rank first, third, and seventh, respectively, for rates of female 
homicides globally.” UNHCR, supra note 2, at 16.
5. Danielle Renwick, Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle, Council on Foreign Rel. (Jan. 19, 
2016), http://www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle/p37286.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Central American gangs are not only extremely violent, but they are also de facto 
governments8 with control over large areas of these Central American countries.9
 Millions are forced to f lee their home countries every year because they face 
persecution.10 The global community created international protection for these 
individuals after World War II,11 in response to the international failure to protect 
those f leeing the Holocaust.12 In 1951 and 1967, governments implemented 
international treaties that require signatory countries “to offer refuge to individuals 
who have a well-founded fear of returning to their home countries.”13 In 1980, the 
United States codified these international laws into U.S. domestic law by enacting 
the Refugee Act of 1980.14
 U.S. asylum law provides that individuals may qualify as refugees if they can 
show that they are unable or unwilling to return to their country because of past 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.15 From 
these requirements, courts derive several elements that must be satisfied for an 
applicant to be eligible for asylum.16
 This note examines the disparate treatment between asylum applicants from 
Central America with gang-based asylum claims and asylum applicants from Colombia 
with FARC-based asylum claims, and contends that both groups should be treated 
equally. This is because both groups are f leeing from countries overrun by groups 
acting as persecutors and from criminal organizations exerting political control.
 Part II of this note discusses the history of asylum law, its codification into U.S. 
domestic law, and the origins and current status of Central American gangs and the 
FARC.17 Part III confronts the disparate, and less favorable, treatment received by 
Central American asylum applicants with gang-based asylum claims. It also analyzes 
8. A de facto government is a term applied to “[a] government that has taken over the regular government 
and exercises sovereignty over a country” or “[a]n independent government established and exercised by 
a group of a country’s inhabitants who have separated themselves from the parent state.” Government: De 
Facto Government, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
9. Max G. Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other 
Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, 
Jamaica, and Brazil 21 (2007), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub837.pdf.
10. Lenni B. Benson et al., Immigration and Nationality Law 855 (2013). 
11. Id.; Immigration Equal., Immigration Equality Asylum Manual 10 (3d. ed. 2014), http://www.
immigrationequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Immigration-Equality_Asylum_Manual.pdf; 
see infra text accompanying notes 18–23.
12. Benson et al., supra note 10, at 855.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
16. See infra text accompanying note 27.
17. Despite both groups currently acting as criminal organizations that wield political control, the genesis 
of Central American gangs and the FARC explains courts’ unequal treatment between residents who 
f lee Central American gangs and those who f lee the FARC.
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how a government’s lack of will or ability to control persecutors is determined when 
adjudicating asylum. Part IV reviews the primary and alternative solutions available 
to gang-based asylum applicants. Part V concludes that the disparate and less 
favorable treatment received by asylum applicants with gang-based asylum claims is 
problematic because there is a humanitarian crisis in Central America, and the 
United States is failing to protect its victims seeking asylum.
II. HISTORY OF ASYLUM LAW, THE FARC, AND CENTRAL AMERICAN GANGS
 A. The History of Asylum Law in the United States
 The right of a state to grant asylum is well established in international law.18 The 
centerpiece of international refugee protection is found in the United Nations 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Convention”).19 The Convention 
was drafted in response to the large migrations from war-torn Europe after World 
War II.20 It defines who are refugees, their rights, and the states’ legal obligations to 
them.21 The Convention was limited to individuals f leeing events that occurred in 
Europe after World War II and before January 1951.22 The 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”) removed the Convention’s geographical and 
temporal restrictions, and provided universal protection for refugees.23
 Asylum law in the United States is based on the Convention and Protocol.24 To 
comply with the Protocol, the United States passed the Refugee Act of 1980, which 
includes a similar definition of “refugee” to that in the Convention and Protocol.25 
The Refugee Act of 1980 defines refugees as people who are outside their country of 
nationality and are unable or unwilling to return to that country because of past 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.26 Therefore, 
asylum applicants must demonstrate all of the following: (1) they are outside their 
country of nationality or last habitual residence; (2) they are unable or unwilling to 
return; (3) they cannot or will not return because of past persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution; and (4) their persecution was on account of a protected 
18. Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 327, 327 (1949).
19. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter Convention].
20. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 10.
21. Convention, supra note 19, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. 
22. Id. at 152, 154.
23. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, ¶ 3, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 
[hereinafter Protocol]. 
24. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 10.
25. Id. 
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
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ground.27 Protected grounds are race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, and political opinion.28
 B. The History of the FARC
 The FARC began as a group of farmers who fled to the mountains to escape 
political violence that broke out after the death of a Liberal Party presidential 
contender in 1948.29 It comprised what were essentially self-defense militias who 
rarely engaged in armed combat with the Colombian government.30 However, change 
came when the Colombian government began to fear the spread of communism.31 In 
May 1964, the Colombian government attempted to defeat these militias in what is 
often considered the start of Colombia’s modern-day guerrilla war.32 These events 
convinced the militias to revolutionize, and to embark in efforts to overthrow the 
sitting government and impose a Marxist government.33
 The FARC originated before the global expansion of Colombia’s illegal drug 
trade.34 For some time, the FARC had refused to participate in the illegal drug trade 
because it viewed the drug trade as destructive to its revolutionary principles.35 But 
by the 1980s, the FARC had succumbed to the lure of the money to be had by 
venturing into the illegal drug trade.36 By the 1990s, a majority of the FARC’s 
resources came from the illegal drug trade and other criminal activities.37 The 
violence that has resulted from the FARC’s criminal activities has forced more than 
five million Colombians from their homes.38
 It is estimated that the FARC generates funds from the illegal drug trade totaling 
between $500 million and $600 million annually.39 In a 2013 report, InSight Crime 
found, “the FARC is one of the most powerful drug trafficking syndicates in 
27. See id. 
28. Id.
29. John Otis, Wilson Ctr., The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal Drug Trade 3 (2014), https://www.
wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups, BBC News (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
latin-america-11400950.
35. Otis, supra note 29, at 3. 
36. Id.
37. Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups, supra note 34.
38. Otis, supra note 29, at 1.
39. The Guerilla Groups in Colombia, UNRIC, http://www.unric.org/en/colombia/27013-the-guerrilla-
groups-in-colombia (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
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Colombia, and perhaps the world.”40 Álvaro Uribe, the President of Colombia from 
2002 to 2010, refused to acknowledge that Colombia was involved in an armed 
conflict with political rebels, and instead identified the FARC as a narco-terrorist 
organization.41
 In recent years, the FARC has released statements that it intends to end the armed 
conflict and become a legal political movement.42 Negotiations for peace between the 
FARC and the Colombian government have been ongoing since 2012.43 The FARC 
is on the list of terrorist organizations in both the United States and Europe.44
 C. The History of Central American Gangs
 The most powerful gangs currently operating in Central America are the 18th 
Street gang (“M-18”) and the Mara Salvatrucha (“MS-13”).45 Both of these gangs 
also operate within the United States.46
 In the 1960s, the M-18 originated in the United States by Mexicans who were 
not accepted into existing Hispanic gangs.47 Eventually, the M-18 became known as 
the gang willing to recruit members from different races and nations of origin.48 In 
the 1980s, the MS-13 originated in Los Angeles by Salvadorans who fled civil war 
in El Salvador,49 in part to protect Salvadorans who recently had immigrated to the 
United States from existing gangs.50
40. Jeremy McDermott, InSight Crime, The FARC, the Peace Process and the Potential 
Criminalisation of the Guerrillas 18 (2013). In 2016, InSight Crime reaffirmed the FARC’s 
dominance in the world drug trade. Jeremy McDermott, What Does Colombia Peace Deal Mean for 
Cocaine Trade?, InSight Crime (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/what-
does-colombia-peace-deal-mean-for-cocaine-trade (stating that “the FARC are the single most 
important organization in the world cocaine trade”).
41. Otis, supra note 29, at 11. Narcoterrorism is “the use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of 
certain governments and terrorist organizations.” Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco Terrorism, at xiii (1990).
42. FARC Aims to Become a Political Movement, TeleSUR (Feb. 8, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/
news/FARC-Aims-to-Become-a-Political-Movement-20150208-0013.html.
43. Id. 
44. Profiles: Colombia’s Armed Groups, supra note 34.
45. Bill Grinstead, Why Haven’t Violent Mara Gangs Spread to Costa Rica?, Costa Rica Star (Aug. 23, 
2013), http://news.co.cr/why-havent-violent-mara-gangs-spread-to-costa-rica/25364.
46. Clare Ribando Seelke, Cong. Research Serv., RL34112, Gangs in Central America 3 (2016), 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34112.pdf. They originated in the United States, but now dominate 
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Leslie Berestein Rojas, Transnational Gangs: The Central 
American Migrant Crisis’ LA Connection, 89.3 KPCC (July 16, 2014), http://www.scpr.org/blogs/
multiamerican/2014/07/16/17018/transnational-gangs-how-the-central-american-migra.
47. Seelke, supra note 46, at 3. 
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Sebastian Amar et al., CAIR Coal., Seeking Asylum from Gang-Based Violence in Central 
America 1 (2007), http://lincolngoldfinch.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/CAIR-Gang-Resource-
Manual.pdf.
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 The expansion of the MS-13 and M-18 accelerated after the United States 
enacted the Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
of 1996.51 The IIRIRA significantly expanded the type of crimes for which 
undocumented immigrants could be removed from the United States, even including 
past crimes.52 In addition to undocumented immigrants, the IIRIRA also removed 
protections afforded to legal permanent residents.53 According to Nancy Morawetz54: 
 Overnight, people who had formed their lives here—came here legally or 
had adjusted to legal status, were working here, building their families, had 
ordinary lives in which they were on the PTA and everything else—suddenly, 
because of some conviction, weren’t even allowed to go in front of a judge 
anymore. They were just fast-tracked to deportation.55
 El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were unprepared to provide the necessary 
social services needed to support such a mass deportation of individuals, many of 
whom were gang members.56 Therefore the IIRIRA, and the resulting mass 
deportation of gang members from the United States to Central America, are widely 
accepted as fundamental parts of the evolution of the MS-13 and M-18.57
 The history of Central American gangs began during civil wars in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua.58 These wars sent thousands fleeing to the United States for refuge.59 While 
in the United States, some of these immigrants joined gangs in Los Angeles.60 Los 
Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department’s gang specialist, John Sullivan believes that 
“[t]hese gangs are part of the cultural fabric of the U.S., not Central America.”61 He 
explains, “[w]e deport them, and they’re bigger and badder than any gangs there, and 
they dominate. And now we have areas [in Central America] that are widely 
51. Seelke, supra note 46, at 3; see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 and 18 U.S.C.).
52. Rojas, supra note 46.
53. It removed protection for legal residents, meaning even individuals who were in the United States legally 
could be removed if they committed an offense included within the IIRIRA. Id.
54. Nancy Morawetz is a professor at NYU School of Law and teaches the Immigrant Rights Clinic. 
Faculty: Nancy Morawetz, NYU L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.
overview&personid=20146 (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
55. Dara Lind, The Disastrous, Forgotten 1996 Law That Created Today’s Immigration Problem, Vox (Apr. 28, 
2016, 8:40 AM), http://www.vox.com/2016/4/28/11515132/iirira-clinton-immigration.
56. Rojas, supra note 46.
57. Id.
58. Scott Johnson, American-Born Gangs Helping Drive Immigrant Crisis at U.S. Border, Nat’l Geographic 
( July 25, 2014), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/07/140723-immigration-minors-
honduras-gang-violence-central-america.
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
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destabilized, with a high degree of violence.”62 Essentially, these gangs went from being 
loosely formed street gangs in the United States to dominant criminal organizations 
that grew into de facto governments in certain areas of Central America.63
 These gangs are involved in criminal activities such as drug trafficking, drug 
smuggling, weapon smuggling, money laundering, alien smuggling, human 
trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, home invasion, murder, and other violent 
felonies.64 A significant portion of these violent crimes is attributed to the MS-13 
and M-18, which operate with impunity.65 As a result, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras consistently rank among the highest homicide rates in the world.66
 The MS-13 and M-18 have increased their control over the citizens of these 
countries and the governments appear either unable or unwilling to control these 
gangs.67 The MS-13 and M-18 are no longer just groups of street thugs.68 A common 
practice of these gangs is to charge a “tax” on residents and business owners in their 
territories.69 Also, when individuals disobey these gangs’ rules there are systematic 
consequences, which can be as extreme as murder.70 The MS-13 and M-18 continue 
to threaten security and challenge government authority in Central America.71
III. DISPARATE TREATMENT OF GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS
 A. Finding a Political Opinion
 Asylum applicants may be eligible for asylum owing to their inability or 
unwillingness to return to their home country because of past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution on account of their political opinion.72 A leading 
62. Id. (alteration in original).
63. See Seelke, supra note 46, at 3, 5.
64. Id. at 3, 5, 7. 
65. WOLA, Central American Gang-Related Asylum: A Resource Guide 2–3 (2008), https://
www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/CA-Gang-Related-Asylum.pdf.
66. Kirk, supra note 4; see also UNODC, Global Study on Homicide 33 (2013), https://www.unodc.org/
documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf.
67. UNHCR, supra note 2, at 15–26. 
68. Amar et al., supra note 50, at 1. 
69. Id. at 1–2. 
70. Id. at 1. 
71. Seelke, supra note 46, at 3–5. 
72. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (2017); see also Qualifying for Asylum, Pol. Asylum USA, http://www.
politicalasylumusa.com/application-for-asylum (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Under U.S. asylum law, 
political opinion is defined broadly. Political Opinion, Pol. Asylum USA, http://www.politicalasylumusa.
com/application-for-asylum/political-opinion-refugee (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). Many forms of free 
speech, including forms that are not “political in nature,” are still worth protecting. Id. For example, in 
some countries, speaking out against corruption can constitute asylum on the ground of political 
opinion. Id.
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case in the area of asylum law is INS v. Elias-Zacarias.73 In this 1992 case, the 
Supreme Court held that forced recruitment by a guerilla group was not necessarily 
persecution on account of political opinion.74 This holding left open the possibility 
that certain instances of gang recruitment could be classified as persecution on 
account of political opinion.75
 In 2008, in Matter of S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G-, the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) stated that the respondents had not established direct or circumstantial 
evidence that the gangs imputed,76 or would impute to the respondents, an anti-gang 
political opinion.77 The BIA concluded that gang members have no motive other 
than increasing the size and influence of their gang.78 Courts relying on Matter of 
S-E-G- and Matter of E-A-G- have interpreted INS v. Elias-Zacarias to mean forced 
recruitment alone cannot constitute persecution on account of political opinion.79 
“These courts have found that resisters of gang recruitment are, instead, targeted 
because of economic and personal reasons,” not political ones.80 This f lawed reasoning 
is the foundation of the disparate treatment between asylum applicants with gang-
based asylum claims and those with FARC-based asylum claims.
 In Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, the Tenth Circuit denied the existence of a political 
opinion even when there was evidence of the applicant’s direct, vocal opposition to 
the gang, the gang’s direct and vocal recognition of that opposition, and the gang’s 
subsequent brutal attack on the applicant, when the gang held her at knife point and 
gang raped her.81 The Tenth Circuit relied on INS v. Elias-Zacarias and held that the 
applicant was targeted primarily for recruitment purposes and not because of a 
73. 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
74. Id. at 481–84. 
75. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 140–42. 
76. “[A] person’s imputed political opinion is also a ground for asylum in the U.S.” Political Opinion, supra 
note 72. This means that if the state or a non-state actor persecutes an individual because it believes the 
individual has a political opinion, the individual can qualify for asylum even if she does not have that 
political opinion. Id.
77. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 589 (B.I.A. 2008); E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 596–97 (B.I.A. 2008).
78. S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 589; E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 597.
79. Dree K. Collopy, AILA’s Asylum Primer 453 (7th ed. 2015); see Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 
9, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that showing one’s refusal to join a gang alone does not constitute 
political opinion); Marroquin-Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
“the mere refusal to join Mara Salvatrucha . . . does not compel a finding that the gang’s threats were on 
account of an imputed political opinion”); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(similar), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855–56 (9th Cir. 2009) (similar); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 
738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (similar), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081.
80. Collopy, supra note 79, at 453.
81. 658 F.3d 1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2011). 
482
THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING TO PROTECT GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS
political opinion.82 The Tenth Circuit ignored contrary evidence,83 as well as the 
“socio-political context in which the persecution occurred.”84
 In contrast, in Martinez-Buendia v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit found a political 
opinion when the asylum applicant demonstrated past persecution by the FARC on 
account of her actual and imputed political opinion.85 The court based its decision on 
the applicant’s testimony, the direct words of the FARC, and evidence that the 
FARC viewed members of a social group called the “Health Brigades” as opponents.86 
The court found that the applicant’s refusal to cooperate with the FARC grew from 
her political views and that the FARC’s violent responses were motivated by her 
views.87 The court distinguished the case from INS v. Elias-Zacarias because of the 
“post-refusal persecution” that the applicant in Martinez-Buendia suffered, which the 
court interpreted as evidence that the FARC targeted Martinez-Buendia because it 
believed she had voiced an anti-FARC political opinion.88
 The disparate treatment between the asylum applicants in these two cases is 
unfair and troubling. Despite the extremely similar factual setting, the Martinez-
Buendia court distinguished Rivera Barrientos v. Holder from INS v. Elias-Zacarias. 
The Seventh Circuit was able to find a nexus89 to political opinion for the applicant 
f leeing the FARC,90 yet the Tenth Circuit denied the existence of a nexus to political 
opinion for the applicant f leeing the Central American gang.91
82. Id. at 1228. 
83. Rivera Barrientos testified to having refused to join the gang several times because of her anti-gang 
beliefs. Id. This testimony was found credible by the Immigration Judge and later ignored by the BIA. Id.
84. Collopy, supra note 79, at 453. 
85. 616 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2010). 
86. Id. at 717.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. To establish asylum eligibility, an applicant must show a nexus between past or feared future persecution 
and one of the five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a 
particular social group. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012). In addition, an applicant must establish that 
a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” Id.
90. Martinez-Buendia, 616 F.3d at 716.
91. Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2011). In Rivera Barrientos, the Tenth Circuit 
failed to apply the proper standard when considering the motives of the persecutors. The INS has made 
clear that persecutors may have several motives to do harm, some of which may be unrelated to any 
protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Therefore, there is no requirement that the persecutor be 
motivated only by a protected belief or characteristic of the applicant. Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 
(B.I.A. 1988), superseded by statute on other grounds, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, as recognized in Gavilano Amado v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 522 Fed. App’x 602 (11th Cir. 2013). All that needs to be established is that a protected ground 
was at least one central reason for the persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Therefore, the Tenth 
Circuit applied the wrong standard because a protected ground does not need to be the primary reason for 
the persecution, but rather one central reason for the persecution. A central reason has been construed to 
mean a reason that is more than “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for 
harm.” Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009).
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 This disparate treatment is caused by courts’ recognition of the FARC’s political 
identity and courts’ refusal to characterize the Central American gangs as anything 
other than criminal organizations, despite country condition reports and expert 
testimony providing evidence that these gangs are political actors. Analysts from the 
U.S. Army War College and the Strategic Studies Institute characterize Central 
American gangs and organized crime groups as non-state actors engaged in efforts to 
establish political domination.92 There is evidence that shows that these gangs are 
attempting to change the political dynamic of certain countries.93 In particular, these 
gangs are “infiltrating the country’s political structures, financing local elections in 
order to secure the positions of [their choice of] candidates,” and even “sponsoring 
students in law school who will act on their behalf as attorneys and judges.”94 The 
Central American gangs have effectively rendered the states irrelevant in major 
respects, and act as de facto governments.95 Therefore, courts’ views that Central 
American gangs are only targeting and persecuting individuals for economic and 
personal reasons misunderstand the reality of life in Central America.
 B. Determining the Government’s Ability or Willingness to Control Persecutors
 Asylum applicants may be eligible for asylum if the persecution was committed 
either by the government or a non-state actor that the government is unable or 
unwilling to control.96 Government actors generally include “the police, the military, 
and government-run schools.”97 “If the persecutor is not a government actor, [asylum] 
applicant[s] must show that the government was unable or unwilling to control the 
persecutor.”98 Guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and gangs are, depending on the 
situation, accepted as groups that the government is unable or unwilling to control.99
92. Howard L. Gray, U.S. Army War Coll., Gangs and Transnational Criminals Threaten 
Central American Stability 1 (2009), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a498136.pdf.
93. Memorandum of Thomas Boerman, Ph. D. & Dir., Thomas Boerman Consulting LLC at 2, quoted in 
Erin Quinn, Staff Att’y, Immigr. Legal Res. Ctr., Eunice Lee, Co-Legal Dir., Ctr. for Gender & 
Refugee Studies, & Thomas Boerman, Presentation at the Immigration Legal Resource Center: Gang 
Based Asylum Claims 109 (Nov. 3, 2015), http://textlab.io/doc/1988871/gang-based-asylum-claims---
immigrant-legal-resource-center. Thomas Boerman is a recognized expert on gangs and other organized 
criminal groups in El Salvador. Id. at 1. He has conducted extensive field research on Central American 
gang activity both in the Central American region and in the United States. Id.
94. Id. at 2.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Mogharrabi, 19 I. 
& N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
97. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 23.
98. Collopy, supra note 79, at 172–73. 
99. Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1359–60 (9th Cir. 1996); Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. 142, 147 (B.I.A. 1990).
484
THE UNITED STATES IS UNWILLING TO PROTECT GANG-BASED ASYLUM APPLICANTS
 Generally, “unable” means the government attempts to help the victims, but the 
government’s attempts are futile.100 Determining whether a government is unable to 
protect an asylum applicant requires a careful evaluation of the applicant’s own 
testimony and country condition reports.101 “Unwilling” means that the government 
does not even attempt to oppose the persecutors.102 Evidence of unwillingness might 
be a refusal to investigate acts of violence or harassment, direct statements by the 
government to the victims expressing unwillingness to protect them, or country 
condition reports demonstrating that incidents of violence or harassment are regularly 
uninvestigated.103
 Yet, there are many Central American gang-based asylum claims in which courts 
fail to find that the Central American governments are unable or unwilling to control 
persecutors within their countries,104 despite the existence of country condition 
reports that support such a determination.105
 In Honduras, the government has been unable to impose any meaningful control 
over the activities of the MS-13.106 The government’s security forces are “unable to 
prevent MS-13 and other large, gangs’ operations.”107 “Investigators [in this area] are 
overwhelmed, and only a tiny fraction of murders, extortions, kidnappings and other 
gang-related criminal activities are ever fully investigated, much less prosecuted.”108
 In El Salvador, there have been efforts, like the “Mano Dura” and “Ley Anti-
Mara,” to control the gangs, but they have been ineffective.109 These efforts included 
100. See Madrigal v. Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 506–07 (9th Cir. 2013); H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 345 (B.I.A. 
1996); Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 147. 
101. See H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 345; Villalta, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 147. 
102. See Joseph Hassell, Persecutor or Common Criminal? Assessing a Government’s Inability or Unwillingness to 
Control Private Persecution, Immigr. L. Advisor, Sept. 2014, at 1, 16. 
103. See Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that the “Russian police rejected [Doe’s] 
first complaint . . . and subsequently dismissed his second complaint without doing anything more than 
interviewing him at the hospital where he was being treated for his injuries,” id. at 879); Gathungu v. 
Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 908–09 (8th Cir. 2013) (stating that the Kenyan government “ignor[ed] the 
attacks altogether or ma[de] a show of arresting the Mungiki members but then releas[ed] them”).
104. See Castillo-Diaz v. Holder, 562 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2009); Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 918, 921–
22 (8th Cir. 2005); Castro-Perez v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005); Lopez-Gomez v. 
Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 446 (5th Cir. 2001).
105. See Letter from Steven Dudley, Co-Dir., InSight Crime, to Leland Baxter Neal, Immigr. Law Grp. PC 
(June 25, 2011) (on file with the New York Law School Immigration Law and Litigation Clinic). Steven 
Dudley is the co-director of InSight Crime, “a joint initiative of American University and the Fundación 
Ideas para la Paz in Colombia, South America.” Id. He has “conducted extensive research, including 
field investigations, into the gangs such as the MS-13 and other, large organized criminal groups in 
Central and South America.” Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. WOLA, Youth Gangs in Central America: Issues in Human Rights, Effective Policing, and 
Prevention 10 (2006); Steven Dudley, How ‘Mano Dura’ Is Strengthening Gangs, InSight Crime 
(Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/how-mano-dura-is-strengthening-gangs.
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detaining and arresting thousands of youths on the basis of their appearance, 
associations, or home address. A majority of these arrests were not legitimate, did 
not hold up in court, and fueled additional gang recruitment.110 In fact, these unduly 
simplistic attempts to address the complex sociological, political, and economic 
problems that these gangs present have been denounced by domestic and international 
human rights organizations because of the egregious human rights violations that 
have resulted.111 The perception that law enforcement and the government are unable 
or unwilling to protect the citizens is widespread in El Salvador,112 where seeking the 
assistance of the police is often perceived as not only futile, but also dangerous.113
 In Guatemala, the MS-13 and M-18 are not controlled by the state.114 “The 
government[] [is] powerless to control the[se] gangs or protect their citizens from 
violence and forced gang recruitment  .  .  .  .”115 The citizens of Guatemala are 
effectively without help from their police and government.116 El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras are “failed states” because they cannot protect their citizens from 
these gangs.117
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Castro-Perez v. Gonzales118 highlights the disparate 
treatment between asylum applicants of gang-based asylum claims and those with 
NARC-based asylum claims. In Castro-Perez, a local gang leader raped the asylum 
applicant twice.119 In support of her claim, the applicant submitted a country condition 
report stating that rape is classified as a crime in the Honduran Penal Code.120 On the 
basis of that report, the Ninth Circuit held that the applicant did not prove that the 
government of Honduras was unable or unwilling to control rape in the country 
because rape is classified as a crime in the Honduran Penal Code.121
 The disparate treatment gang-based asylum applicants receive is further 
highlighted by the courts’ treatment of asylum applicants in two FARC asylum cases: 
110. Dudley, supra note 109.
111. Memorandum of Thomas Boerman, supra note 93, at 2.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Memorandum of Victoria Sanford, Ph.D., Dir., Ctr. for Human Rights & Peace Studies, Lehman Coll. 
(Aug. 6, 2014) (on file with the New York Law School Immigration Law and Litigation Clinic). Victoria 
Sanford is a professor and Chair of Anthropology at Lehman College. Id. She has “conducted extensive 
field research with Maya communities in Guatemala  .  .  . and Colombian Refugee communities in 
Ecuador.” Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 409 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2005).
119. Id. at 1070–71. 
120. Id. at 1072.
121. Id.
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Arboleda v. Attorney General122 and Escobar v. Holder.123 In Arboleda, the Eleventh 
Circuit granted asylum to a married couple who fled the FARC after being persecuted 
because of the husband’s work with the Conservative Party.124 The Eleventh Circuit 
based its reasoning on two country condition reports and data that proved the FARC 
was a country-wide guerilla group.125 In Escobar, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
because of “the strength of the FARC in Colombia,  .  .  . its ongoing war with the 
Colombian government,” and the Colombian government’s inability to eliminate the 
FARC, the “state action” element was easily met.126
 This note does not contend that these FARC cases were wrongly decided, it 
merely points out the disparate treatment between the two different groups of asylum 
applicants. Gang-based asylum applicants are being denied asylum because courts 
are not finding that the governments are unable or unwilling to control persecutors. 
In FARC cases, numerous country condition reports are being used to grant asylum, 
while in Central American gang-based cases, at least in certain examples, there is a 
limited amount of country condition reports being used to deny asylum. Furthermore, 
in Escobar, it was stated that the asylum applicant “easily” met the state action element 
“[g]iven the strength of FARC in Colombia, its state-like status, its ongoing war 
with the Colombian government, and the impotence of the government over 
FARC.”127 All these descriptions can be used to describe Central American gangs 
and Central American governments’ inability or unwillingness to control them.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
 A. Primary Solution
 The primary solution is based in practicality: argue asylum claims differently for 
applicants with gang-based asylum claims. There is an argument to be made that 
these Central American gangs have taken control of a significant amount of territory 
in Central America and are serving as de facto governments.128 Asylum applicants 
have submitted varying asylum claims based on political opinion, but these claims 
have not been widely accepted.129 Reasons for seeking asylum in these claims have 
122. 434 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2006).
123. 657 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2011).
124. Arboleda, 434 F.3d at 1222.
125. Id. at 1224–25. 
126. Escobar, 657 F.3d at 543. 
127. Id.
128. Manwaring, supra note 9, at 21; Jillian N. Blake, Gang and Cartel Violence: A Reason to Grant Political 
Asylum from Mexico and Central America, 38 Yale J. Int’l L. Online 31, 37 (2012).
129. Blake, supra note 128, at 31, 36, 45.
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included refusing to join the gangs,130 refusing to be extorted,131 and testifying as a 
witness or serving as an informant.132 However, there have been some successes in 
these categories, so there is reason to believe that there is a path to arguing more 
gang-based asylum claims successfully.
 First, asylum applicants need to clearly articulate their legal arguments.133 In 
particular, they should separate the analysis of whether an expression or action is a 
political opinion from whether the persecutors were motivated to harm the applicant 
because of that political opinion.134 This is because identifying the political opinion 
and the nexus are separate issues.135
 Second, asylum applicants should identify the actual or imputed political opinion. 
Political opinion can be “imputed” to an asylum applicant,136 so even if asylum 
applicants do not actually have that political opinion, they can still be eligible for 
asylum if they are persecuted for that “imputed” political opinion.137 Examples of 
imputed political opinion in this context could include the persecution of children of 
anti-gang political activists, family members of gang-resisters, or women who resist 
being seen as property by a gang.138
 Third, asylum applicants should demonstrate in the evidentiary record not just 
their activities and the gang members’ knowledge of and reaction to those activities, 
but also the gang’s operations as de facto governments.139
 Fourth, asylum applicants and their counsel will need to address Elias-Zacarias. 
In this case, the Supreme Court held that forced recruitment by a guerilla group was 
not necessarily persecution on account of political opinion.140 However, the case has 
been interpreted to mean that gangs do not persecute individuals on account of 
130. Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 17–19 (1st Cir. 2012); Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 
1225 (10th Cir. 2011); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26–27 (1st Cir. 2010); Marroquin-
Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir. 2009). 
131. Marroquin-Ochoma, 574 F.3d at 578; Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009); 
Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2007). 
132. Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012); Velasco-Cervantes v. Holder, 593 F.3d 975, 978 
(9th Cir. 2010), overruled by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013); Soriano v. 
Holder, 569 F.3d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009), overruled by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081. 
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
134. See id.; Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655–56 (9th Cir. 2000).
135. See Navas, 217 F.3d at 655–56. 
136. Uwais v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 478 F.3d 513, 517 (2d Cir. 2007); Mulanga v. Ashcroft, 349 F.3d 123, 133 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2003); Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1997); Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d 375, 379 
(9th Cir. 1995); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601–02 (9th Cir. 1992).
137. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992); Hamdan v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 986, 992–93 (7th Cir. 
2008); Pascual v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2007); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1195 
(9th Cir. 2007).
138. Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004); S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 497 
(B.I.A. 1996).
139. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482–83.
140. Id. at 482–84.
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political opinion.141 Therefore, asylum applicants must be able to distinguish their 
case from Elias-Zacarias by demonstrating (1) clear, direct expression of political 
opinion, (2) that persecution is on account of political opinion, and (3) that 
persecution occurred after the political opinions became known.142
 B. Alternative Legal Solutions
 Courts should appreciate that gang-based asylum claims can be difficult, 
especially in light of conflicting case law. In deciding whether to pursue a gang-
based asylum case, advocates should also consider other legal relief that may be 
available through such avenues as the Convention Against Torture (CAT),143 Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS),144 the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),145 
or T146 nonimmigrant status.
 “Relief under the [CAT] is [another] form of relief an individual fearing 
persecution can seek.”147 To receive CAT relief, the applicants must establish that 
more likely than not they will be tortured if they are returned to their country of 
origin.148 Torture is defined as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
141. See Mayorga-Vidal v. Holder, 675 F.3d 9, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2012); Rivera Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 
1222, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2011); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010); Marroquin-
Ochoma v. Holder, 574 F.3d 574, 578–79 (8th Cir. 2009); Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 
2009); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by 
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 
747 (9th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d 1081.
142. See Kate M. Manuel, Cong. Research Serv., R43716, Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal 
Overview 11–12 (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43716.pdf.
143. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 112.
144. Congress created SIJS in 1990, and designed it for “children in the United States who do not have 
permanent residence and have been abused, neglected or abandoned by one or both parents.” History of 
SIJ Status, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-
juveniles/history-sij-status (last updated July 12, 2011).
145. Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 16, 18, 
28, and 42 U.S.C.), invalidated by United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000). VAWA was 
created in 1994 as “a comprehensive legislative package targeting violence against women.” History of 
VAWA, FaithTrust Inst., http://www.ncdsv.org/images/HistoryofVawa.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
146. Congress created the T nonimmigrant status in 2000 by passing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act (VTVPA) of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2012)); Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigr. Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-traff icking-other-crimes/
victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status (last updated Oct. 3, 2011). The VTVPA enhanced 
law enforcement agencies’ ability to “investigate” and “offer protection to victims.” Id.
147. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 37. 
148. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2017).
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third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by . . . a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity.149
Further, “an individual who is successful under a CAT claim cannot be removed 
from the United States to the country from which she f led persecution, but can be 
removed to a third country if one is available.”150
 SIJS is another form of immigration relief, but it is limited to juveniles.151 It is 
available to “certain undocumented immigrants under the age of 21 who have been 
abused, neglected, or abandoned by one or both parents.”152 To qualify for SIJS, an 
immigrant juvenile must meet certain criteria. The applicant must be: (1) under 
twenty-one years old; (2) unmarried; (3) declared dependent in a juvenile court; (4) 
unable to reunite with one or both of her parents because of abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis under state law; and (5) in a situation in which it 
would be against her best interests to return to her country of nationality or last 
habitual residence.153 “Once a minor receives SIJS, [she] will be able to adjust [her] 
status to that of a lawful permanent resident, obtain work authorization, and 
eventually apply for U.S. citizenship.”154
 VAWA, which provides another form of immigration relief, seeks to protect 
women from spousal abuse.155 It provides immigration status for certain battered 
noncitizens.156 Those eligible individuals include the abused spouse of a U.S. citizen 
or permanent resident, the abused parent of a U.S. citizen, and the abused child of a 
U.S. citizen or permanent resident.157 Applicants must provide extensive evidence to 
149. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra 
note 143, 1465 U.N.T.S. at 113–14.
150. Immigration Equal., supra note 11, at 37. Applicants who are denied asylum in one country can apply 
for asylum in another country under certain conditions, such as: (1) being an unaccompanied minor; (2) 
having family in the third country; or (3) having a valid visa or not needing a visa to enter the third 
country. Id. at 46.
151. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, Safe Passage Project, http://www.safepassageproject.org/what-is-
sij-status (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Allan Wernick, Domestic Abuse Victims Who Are Seeking Their Green Cards Can Turn to Law for Help, 
N.Y. Daily News (Mar. 25, 2016, 4:11 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/citizenship-now/
abuse-victims-seeking-green-cards-turn-law-article-1.2577265.
156. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), ICWC, http://icwclaw.org/services-available/violence-against-
women-act-vawa (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
157. Battered Spouse, Children & Parents, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Serv., https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/battered-spouse-children-parents (last updated Feb. 16, 2016).
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prove battery, abuse, extreme cruelty, and proof of the qualifying relationship to the 
abuser.158 Once relief under VAWA is granted,
immigrants are classified into categories based on a preference system. Self-
petitioners who are immediate relatives of U.S. Citizens  .  .  . are eligible to 
adjust status to a lawful permanent resident status when their VAWA petition 
is approved. Spouses and children of lawful permanent residents must wait 
for an immigrant visa to become available for their category. These petitioners 
will be able to obtain work authorization until they are eligible to apply for 
permanent residency.159
 One final form of potential relief is the T nonimmigrant visa,160 created by the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (VTVPA).161 The VTVPA is 
aimed at strengthening the U.S. law enforcement’s ability to investigate and prosecute 
human trafficking.162 It also protects those who are or have been victims of human 
trafficking by allowing them to remain in the United States.163 To be eligible for a T 
nonimmigrant visa, applicants must be victims of trafficking, be located in the 
United States (or certain other specified territories), be able to comply with reasonable 
requests from a law enforcement agency to assist in the investigation or prosecution 
of human trafficking, demonstrate that they would suffer extreme hardship involving 
unusual and severe harm if removed from the United States, and not be inadmissible164 
to the United States.165
V. CONCLUSION
 In conclusion, asylum applicants with gang-based asylum claims receive unfair 
treatment in their asylum proceedings. In particular, asylum applicants from Central 
America with gang-based asylum claims receive different, less favorable treatment 
than asylum applicants from Colombia with FARC-based asylum claims. The 
genesis of this disparate treatment stems from the political or criminal origins of 
each group, despite both groups currently acting as criminal organizations with 
political control. The primary solution is to adjust the legal approach and strategies 
taken by the legal counsel of gang-based asylum applicants. The alternative solution 
158. Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), supra note 156. 
159. Id.
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (2012). 
161. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7110 (2012); Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 146.
162. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 146.
163. Id.
164. “In order to gain entry to the U.S., a foreign national must meet all applicable statutory requirements 
and must demonstrate that [she] is not inadmissible under INA § 212(a).” Sarah E. Murphy, Grounds of 
Inadmissibility, Border Immigr. Law., http://www.borderimmigrationlawyer.com/grounds-of-inadmissibility 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2017). For a list of grounds applied for inadmissibility, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
165. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, supra note 146.
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is to utilize other legal remedies to provide protection for Central Americans who are 
f leeing gang-based persecution.
 Our courts’ treatment of most of the thousands of Central Americans f leeing 
gang-based persecution is unjust.166 The United States should no longer subscribe to 
the fiction that these gangs are mere criminal organizations. The gangs are de facto 
governments in large areas of Central America and are causing mass migrations of 
human beings because of their violent and destructive control. Already, there have 
been many instances in which individuals denied gang-based asylum were 
immediately murdered upon their return to Central America.167 It is time for the 
United States to begin to treat asylum applicants who are f leeing Central American 
gangs like they do asylum applicants who are f leeing the FARC.
166. See Selena Hill, Central Americans Denied Asylum in US Killed upon Return, Latin Post (Oct. 14, 2015, 
4:45 PM), http://www.latinpost.com/articles/86876/20151014/immigration-news-us-deporting-central-
american-asylum-seekers-who-are-then-killed-in-hometowns-report-found.htm; Laura Tillman, Meet 
Luis. He Fled Gangs in Honduras. But the U.S. Probably Won’t Protect Him., New Republic (June 26, 
2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/118422/why-doesnt-america-protect-latino-migrants-f leeing-
violent-gangs.
167. Sibylla Brodzinsky et al., US Government Deporting Central American Migrants to Their Deaths, 
Guardian (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-
immigration-deportations-central-america.
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